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The body in question in research methodology: “Death of 
the Author” and “the Pearly Gates of Cyberspace” 
By Mary Hanrahan 
In educational research, theses are still expected to support the myth that learning which 
will advance knowledge about education is almost exclusively the product of abstract and 
systematic logical processes, of a disembodied spirit.  In my PhD thesis, I demonstrated 
that a significant role was played in the construction of my knowledge by my body[-
mind], much of it initially outside my awareness.  This paper will address the tensions 
between dualistic traditions of our culture (cf. Wertheim, 1999) and new ways of 
understanding how people come to know what they know (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Lear, 
1998; Lemke, 1995; Maturana & Varela, 1992; Sacks, 1998), and apply them to issues of 
research methodology and thesis presentation. 
 
At the heart of this story is the age-old tension in Western culture between 
body and mind--in all its myriad manifestations, including that particular 
manifestation that Christians call the `soul'. (Wertheim, 1999, p. 30) 
 
As researchers we may no longer believe in objectivity as a key criterion of good research, or even 
hold that it is a meaningful concept to use in relation to research.  By shunning positivism, adopting 
interpretive approaches to research, and espousing varying degrees of relativism, we think we have 
escaped the influence of Descartes, the 17th century French philosopher who has been blamed both for 
leading us down an objectivist path of thinking, and for a cult of individualism responsible for many of 
the evils of the modern world (cf. Barthes, 1977; Lemke, 1995).  However, I believe we are mistaken 
about thinking we have left objectivist practices behind, particularly when it comes to thesis writing 
(and evaluation), and I believe we are not entirely fair to Descartes either.  It seems to me to be 
inconsistent to criticize Cartesian dualism and yet to refuse to even consider the implications of taking 
a non-dualist position for research and research writing, that is, to consider what it might mean in 
practice to view the mind and body as an integral and inseparable unit: an embodied mind or a 
thinking-experiencing body.   
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A particular concern I have in this regard is that, in spite of huge epistemological shifts in the last few 
decades, the unwritten rules of academic writing have been slow to change to allow what I would see 
as greater consistency between epistemology and genre.  It has been my experience that the preferred 
style of writing is still impersonal and authoritative (within a particular paradigm), with knowledge 
being represented as the result of straightforward, if complex, conscious logical processes within a 
single discourse system.  The writer is meant to act as though her own learning happened as a “purely” 
intellectual process and was uncontaminated by personal experiences of any kind, and as though the 
resulting knowledge was independent of time, place and personal (including bodily) context.  
This was an issue that came up repeatedly in relation to my PhD thesis.  At the time, I thought I was 
dealing with epistemological or philosophical arguments but later I began to think that that was only 
the tip of the iceberg.  The bulk of the resistance to what I was proposing may have been the result of 
subconsciously held cultural beliefs, or, if such beliefs were held more consciously, of a particular 
moral aesthetic.  It seems as though associating body processes with intellectual matters is quite 
simply taboo in parts of Western culture, including much of the educational research culture as I know 
it, even that part of it that would want to put the body-mind dualism under erasure. 
This may be why the words “there must be death of the Author” has sometimes been taken more 
literally than ever Barthes (1977) intended it.  In his “Death of the Author” text he was only referring 
to narrative (novels, myths, etc.).  In other parts of the same book, he is present in the text as author.  
For example, he wrote a preamble to a structural analysis to prepare the reader for an unexpected type 
of analysis.  In yet another chapter, he explained in a footnote that for both poetry and argument (in 
contrast to narrative), appreciation was “dependent on the cultural level of the consumer” (p. 79), 
which would presumably mean that some further explanation would be needed for a “consumer” at a 
different cultural level in this implied (monocultural) hierarchy.  These days, we would be more likely 
to allow that understanding is not simply a matter of level of education of the reader.  Differences in 
cultural code within the one society could also provide a barrier to understanding for some readers (cf. 
Bernstein, 1990), and such differences would be seen as qualitative rather than quantitative, that is, 
that meaning is to a great extent a matter of intertextuality (cf. Lemke, 1995).  It is generally believed 
that different cultures do exist and that it is not always a simple matter to translate meaning from one 
to another.  For example, as Knight (1995) pointed out, the anti-humanism of French poststructuralists 
may have been a reaction against a somewhat different kind of humanism to that in the English-
speaking world to which it has been applied.  A too literal translation may have resulted in the 
rewriting of notions such as identity, agency, and mental illness, in ways that Foucault might not 
recognise as his own. 
This paper, then, is a risky attempt to write in a space between sociocultural, philosophical, linguistic 
and medical discourses.  However, it does not attempt to bridge the space so much as to take a reader 
conversant with any or all of these discourses into a new space where a major assumption of all four is 
called into question:  the assumption that human understanding is best served when the intellect 
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transcends the physical using purely intellectual tools, that is, when the mind is shown to operate 
independently of the body, in as far as is possible.  Ironically but pragmatically, this means using an 
intellectual argument here to question the superiority of intellectual arguments for communication and 
learning.  (By contrast, in the conference paper which contained the germ of this paper (Hanrahan, 
1998), I wrote two alternative discussion sections, one a personal narrative of the course my thinking 
had taken and the second a more “scholarly” impersonal logical argument.) 
In the paper I take the view, which I would like to call post-posthumanist (cf. Knight, 1995), that the 
physical world exists quite apart from our awareness of it, and that it includes living beings (including 
humans) that interact with each other and the rest of their environment in ways that depend as much on 
the existence of the physical properties of such bodies (including psychological properties such as 
awareness) as they do on larger cultural and physical systems.  My main concern with seeing meaning 
being treated as properly the province of the intellect alone is that, for me, there is a material world.  
To differentiate it from a “meaning system”, Lemke (1995) refers to it as a  “dynamic open 
[biophysical] system” (p. 162) or “an interaction system” (p. 183).  This world includes living, 
interacting bodies, and the intellect as we know it is an inseparable component of this material, 
biophysical system, and is circum-scribed by it as much as culture is in-scribed on the material world 
as we see it. 
The case of perceptions and emotions 
One could argue that some aspects of the mind are dependent on the body while others are not, just as 
Descartes (1637/1990) separated pure intellect (which he saw as reliable) and the evidence of the 
senses (which were less reliable).  However, this starts to seem analogous to having a “God of the 
gaps” who is needed less and less as an explanatory principle the more science advances.  How much 
of “pure intellect” will remain after a few decades more of neuroscientific discoveries?  As Princess 
Elizabeth of Bohemia, a pupil of Descartes’, pondered in her correspondence with him, 
It is very hard to see how a soul such as you describe, after possessing the power and the habit of 
correct reasoning, may lose all that because of some vapours [in the brain]; or why the soul is so 
much governed by the body, when it can subsist separately, and has nothing in common with it.  
(Anscombe & Geach, 1970, p. 278). 
Most obviously what one senses (feels, hears, tastes, smells, sees) is usually (but not always, as 
Descartes pointed out) at least partly explicable in terms of the organs of perception interacting with 
the immediate environment.  The emotions are also usually relegated to “less-than-pure” intellect, 
particularly as they are usually demonstrated in obvious ways by the body (blushing, facial 
expressions, posture, tone of voice, quickened heartbeat, etc.).  The fact that such shows of expression 
can be suppressed to a greater or lesser degree also suggests that they are under the control of the 
conscious part of the mind.  However recent research, for example that of Damasio (1994) which deals 
with people who have had particular kinds of brain damage, suggests that the emotions are integral to 
the working of what are usually considered higher mental functions such as problem-solving, decision-
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making, and creativity.   
Damasio (1994), a neurologist who became interested "in the neural underpinnings of reason” (p. 1), 
made a particular study of people whose ability to experience emotions and feelings was impaired, and 
became convinced that reason was dependent on emotions for effective functioning.  He proposed that 
feeling states acted as “somatic markers”, signals in the body that were used to evaluate one’s options 
almost instantaneously according to past experience.  These resulted in increased attention being 
accorded to whatever sparked the emotion underlying the feeling state.  He wrote: 
I propose that a somatic state, negative or positive, caused by the appearance of a given 
representation, operates not only as a marker for the value of what is represented, but also as a 
booster for continued working memory and attention.  The proceedings are `energised’ by signs 
that the process is actually being evaluated, positively or negatively, in terms of the individual's 
preferences and goals.  The allocation and maintenance of attention and working memory do not 
happen by miracle.  They are first motivated by preferences inherent in the organism, and then by 
preferences and goals acquired on the basis of the inherent ones.”  (Damasio, 1994, p. 198) 
Hence he concluded that:  
The action of biological drives, body states, and emotions may be an indispensable foundation for 
rationality. … Rationality is probably shaped and modulated by body signals, even as it performs 
the most sublime distinctions and acts accordingly.  (p. 200).   
He found that lack of feelings (which could be found in individuals who had suffered particular brain 
damage) did not prevent logical processing; what it prevented was “knowing” what to do with the 
result: there was no necessary connection between thought and action.  Will was similarly dependent 
on evaluation linked to somatic markers.   
Willpower draws on the evaluation of a prospect, and that evaluation may not take place if 
attention is not properly driven to both the immediate trouble and the future payoff, to both the 
suffering now and the future gratification.  Remove the latter and your remove the lift from under 
your willpower's wings.  Willpower is just another name for the idea of choosing according to 
long-term outcomes rather than short-term ones.”  (Damasio, 1994, p. 175) 
Damasio did not dispute the influence of external social factors on what came to be defined as 
feelings, though he did believe that primary emotions were present from the beginning and were the 
foundations on which others were built.  Hence he did not deny the influence of “education” on how 
feelings were associated with concepts in ways that meant the latter were then more (or less) valued.   
Beliefs, feelings, and intentions are indeed the result of a number of factors rooted in our 
organisms and in the culture in which we have been immersed, even if such factors may be 
remote and we may not be aware of them.  If there are neurophysiological and educational 
reasons making it likely for some people to be honest and generous, so be it.”  (Damasio, 1994, p. 
176) 
Similarly, as I have explained in more detail elsewhere (Hanrahan, 1998), research in the cognitive 
science field on creativity, (scientific) intuition, and insight has suggested that (the physiological as 
well as cognitive components of) feelings have an important role to play in such processes.  (E.g., see 
Collins, Brown and Newman, 1989; Fensham & Marton, 1992; Lear, 1998; Poincaré, 1913; Sacks, 
1998; Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano and Yaniv, 1995).  Briefly, feelings alert the mind to what is 
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important to attend to, provide the motivation for goal-directed persistence, create frustration that begs 
to be resolved, and, finally, can give great pleasure when insight is achieved which, besides being 
rewarding in itself, may predispose for similar experiences in the future.  I also argued that mood 
changes (which have physiological correlates) may affect the nature as well as the content of thinking, 
and that there are many mental disorders that affect thinking processes, some of which have a 
physiological component that may be altered using drug therapy, with thinking processes becoming 
more ordered as a result. 
Other mind-body dependencies 
An important point to note here is that it is not only feelings which are highlighted as a neglected area 
that links the processes of the mind with the body.  Two other characteristics of the mind are also 
evident.  One is the process of association, of making automatic links that do not depend on logic.  In 
an earlier work I wrote that Lear (1998, in Hanrahan, 1998), a psychoanalyst who was concerned with 
the apparent restlessness of the mind, “posits that an important property of the mind is the making of 
associations which, although random, can be recruited for one’s purposes” (Hanrahan, 1998, p. 7 of 
17).  I further commented that   
the `antechamber’ or the `back of the mind’ phenomena seems to suggest that when we are 
motivated to solve unsolved problems or to resolve cognitive conflict, then cues for such 
problems are held within reach, just outside consciousness but easily available for associative 
thinking.”  (Hanrahan, 1998, Insight, ¶ 4)   
This brings me to the second mental process that I believe has been largely unacknowledged in 
academic research: tacit knowledge, or, more broadly, memory.  Memory is a facet of the functioning 
of humans (and other organisms) that is crucial to successful participation in complex systems, and 
tacit knowledge could be seen as an explicitly organic aspect of memory. 
In Hanrahan (1998), besides referring to tacit knowledge which “may enter awareness in an 
incomplete form such as (a) compelling intuitions, and (b) dissonant emotional or other behavioural 
reactions” (p. 6 of 17), I referred to further tacit processes of knowledge: 
Polanyi (1966/1983, p. 40) wrote, “we can know more than we can tell”.  Some components of 
such knowledge are almost entirely outside conscious control but could be brought to awareness 
to some extent if required.  These include (a) prior knowledge which has become automatic, for 
example, ways of perceiving and ways of interrelating interpersonally, which will include both 
ordinary and technical language use as well as non-verbal behaviour, (b) assumptions about what 
is or is not of particular value for problem solving in the area, (c) generalised beliefs about 
oneself and one's capabilities, and also about how others are likely to behave.  (Hanrahan, 1998, 
Tacit Knowledge, ¶ 1) 
Rather than being irrelevant to thinking, such tacit processes are integral to mental functioning.  In this 
light, knowledge has to be seen as embodied practice, rather than the construction of some “thing” 
which can be isolated or objectified.  A language artefact may be a thing but its meaning can only be 
decoded as part of human practice within a particular system. 
Like Damasio (1994), Maturana and Varela (1992) were prompted by what they learnt from 
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neuroscience to investigate “the biology of human understanding”.  However, like Lemke (1995), they 
situated human understanding as a dynamic component of a larger ecological system, which in their 
case meant a biological system, whereas Lemke’s focus was the ecosocial system.  Maturana and 
Varela’s principal conclusion was consistent with what Maturana believed, that knowledge was a 
matter of practice, with an organism at any level—including the human—mutually interacting with its 
environment (including other organisms) in a complex way involving the integration of many bodily 
processes.  In Hanrahan (1998) I explained this view of knowledge as practice and looked at the 
implications of this.  The following passage also indicates how this view (which I was later to refer to 
an “ecobiosocial system” perspective (Hanrahan, 1999)) is both consistent with and different from a 
sociocultural perspective.   
Knowledge is seen as “effective action, that is, operating effectively in the domain of existence of 
living beings” (p. 29), and can be summed up in two aphorisms, “All doing is knowing and all 
knowing is doing” and “Everything said is said by someone” (Maturana & Varela, 1992, p. 26). 
They [Maturana & Varela] argue against a representational view of knowledge as “information” 
which is held and used for action.  Rather they see “animal and environment as two sides of the 
one coin” (p. 253), mutually dependent with neither being able to be defined effectively in 
isolation from the other.  Knowledge is the result of both history and present circumstances. 
They have elaborated their theory of the biology of human understanding progressively, 
beginning with the origin of unicellular life on earth, and tracing it through the history of its 
development into multicellular organisms and thence to complex organisms with nervous systems 
to more complex systems which may have developed logical accounting, cognitive acts, social 
and cultural phenomena, language and reflective consciousness, and finally reflexivity and ethics. 
Knowledge in humans, therefore, is not restricted to conscious cognitive activity, but represents 
the sum total of their recurrent behaviour in relation to their environment, whether they are 
conscious of it or not.  (Hanrahan, 1998, The Biology of Human Understanding, ¶ 1-4) 
In some ways this is dealing with knowledge as sociology deals with it: a cultural and historical 
production.  The notable difference is that knowledge is seen here as differing from individual to 
individual (person to person) because each is active in the process as a different em-body-ed and en-
history–ed individual; rather than being formed by their environment, the behaviour of each is the 
result of an interaction between that particular organic person and the environment. 
Understanding the part played by components in a system involves understanding that no 
environmental or even internal factor is ever a “cause” of change in the organism; the most it can 
be is a trigger for a chain of events whose outcome will depend on structure and functioning of 
the system which itself will depend to some extent on the presence of other elements in the 
organism’s environment.  (Hanrahan, 1998, The Biology of Human Understanding, ¶ 5) 
Knowledge is embodied practice and as such cannot exist without the body (and hence digital 
downloading of the brain, even if it were possible, would not result in a computer possessing the 
knowledge of a living person/body).  Even genes, Maturana & Varela argued, should be seen in this 
light, as they are not predestined to be realised in a particular way, but rather interact with the 
environment to produce a particular result which will depend on the nature of that environment.   
This is to the advantage of the organism, as it means it develops in such a way that its essential 
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features are compatible with its environment rather than in a way which, being predetermined, 
might make it poorly adapted to its environment.  (Hanrahan, 1998, The Biology of Human 
Understanding, ¶ 4) 
Lemke (1995) similarly explained discourse as practice within a particular “ecosocial” or “meaning” 
system and stressed the importance of the system having an “epigenetic strategy” (p. 160) for the 
survival of systems in a changing environment.  However, like Barthes and Foucault, he was mainly 
interested in knowledge at the level of the social system and what happened at the level of a particular 
body did not concern him as much.  Like them he thought that humans as individual agents had been 
accorded too much importance in recent centuries.  Not only has this led to blindness about the extent 
to which individual behaviour was socially determined, but also to short-sightedness about the extent 
to which the welfare of the individual depended on the welfare of larger ecosocial and biophysical 
systems.   
I would argue, however, that the pendulum may now be swinging too far in the opposite direction, and 
that neglect of knowledge at the level of the individual body-mind may also be detrimental, in 
particular in the way it may limit research methodology and research writing.  A posthumanist position 
leaves unexamined several assumptions underlying research genres that are based on a body-mind 
distinction that treats the goings on in the body as irrelevant.  Besides running the risk of supporting 
the kind of pedagogy that fails to engage students (see Hanrahan, 1999, for a discussion of problems in 
science education that may be due to a failure to integrate biological, psychological, and sociological 
theories of human understanding), it also implicitly supports the conventions of academic writing that 
fail to allow a place for the individual body and consciousness in research.  Nor does it address the 
paradox involved in individual intellectual activity that acts as though there is no role for individual 
intellectual activity. 
Table 1 provides a summary in relation to the mind-body issue of the implications of various discourse 
systems as seen from an ecological (biophysical plus social) system perspective.  As with any such 
summary table, it is over-simplified and does not do full justice to the philosophies or research 
paradigms addressed.  It is intended merely to draw attention quickly to my major concerns as a 
researcher and writer.  These concerns are about discourses that in one way or another dismiss the 
notion of the human person or the necessity of the body for intellectual functioning. 
Poststructuralists will no doubt be surprised that they figure here as an example of dualist thinking, 
albeit as only one pole of the binary since they ignore material reality; and no doubt they would 
contest my categorisation.  However, a view of the world in which both human subjectivities and 
bodies are seen as mere cultural constructs, may paradoxically be based on a subconscious desire to 
achieve an intellectual state unsullied by association with the body, in somewhat the same way that 
Greek idealists, traditional Christians and French idealists such as Mallarmé (cf. Barthes, 1977) sought 
a metaphysical reality that would transcend (and live on beyond) physical reality (Lagarde & Michard, 
1965).  By finding meaning only in texts they reify the intellectual while denying the body.  Even 
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while granting that poststructuralist texts demonstrate effectively that a great deal of what we take to 
be “natural” is in fact a cultural artefact, I believe that human beings can have subjective experiences 
(consciousness) and agency that goes beyond what they have gained through socialisation.  Reality is a 
lived psychophysical experience, not a purely mental one.  Awareness is not necessarily totally 
constructed by culture.  
9  The body in question in research methodology 
Mary Hanrahan   Proofed chapter 06/03/02 
Table 1.  Relationships between schools of thought and beliefs about research writing 
Material (M) wrt 
immaterial (I) 
Nature of  meaning Mind/ “I” Possible 
location 
Implications for research and academic writing in 2001 
M                      I 
 
   M             I          
              
Idealist: higher reality 
obtained by 
transcending material 
experience 
Mind has agency, can know 
higher reality by mental work 
(and denying body)  
Platonic 
idealism, 
Christianity, 
French 
idealism  
• Goal of attaining metaphysical knowledge 
• Writing to exemplify the rational mind and rules of rhetoric 
 
 
 
Dualist: material and 
spiritual worlds 
coexist; knowledge 
about either based on 
evidence 
Mind has consciousness and 
agency; is affected by the 
senses, feelings 
 
 
Cartesian 
rationalism 
• Objectivist research; with knowledge to be based on 
“clear evidence” and justified rationally; universal 
knowledge as goal 
• Author may be present but only as interpreter of  “pure 
intellect” 
 “Monist 1”: material 
world is the only 
verifiable reality; 
spiritual world does not 
affect material world 
Mind is a data processor; works 
best when detached from body 
processes (e.g., affect, senses); 
can be both subject and object 
of knowledge 
Pre-
relativist  
science 
• Objectivist research, subjectivity banned with goal of 
achieving knowledge with universal value 
• Authoritative, impersonal writing 
 “Monist 2”: reality created in discourse; 
material world = texts; 
knowers implied but 
not recognised 
Identity (including multiple 
notions of body, “I”, agency, 
mind, human persons) created 
by socialization; other activity in 
individual minds is irrelevant 
French 
poststruct-
uralism (as 
texts) 
• Knowledge/meaning only [meaning]ful at the level of 
culture; the material is only a construction/textual reading  
• Abstract writing, with author “under erasure”; tension in 
writing between cultural proprieties and ironic 
perspective/critique  
 Physical reality exists; 
part of body-mind may 
exist without body 
Mind is data which in future 
could be downloaded; multiple 
subjectivities may co-exist 
independently 
Cyber 
space texts 
• Knowledge as discrete data which can exist 
independently of the body 
• Subjectivity acceptable, including multiple subjectivities; 
[only science fiction writing as yet] 
 
Ecological: meaning is 
embodied practice 
within biological-social 
system 
Mind-body unit makes meaning 
only through interacting with 
environment which at the same 
time produces it; consciousness 
(and sense of “I”) is necessary 
for the interactions 
Ecological 
system 
theories 
• Knowing is embodied practice, the result of interaction 
between the “person” and internal and external systems; 
it includes tacit knowledge 
• Writing may reflect practice in several concurrent 
discourse communities; meaning is negotiated between 
writer and reader, personal perspective inevitable so best 
acknowledged 
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In fact, Descartes was less extreme in his separation of the physical and the mental.  We are told that in 
both cogito ergo sum and “je pense donc je suis”, what has been rendered in English as “I think, therefore I 
am” in fact is closer to “I experience therefore I exist” in the original  (Anscombe & Geach, 1952/1970).  
Descartes’s elaborations make it quite clear that he included feeling, willing, doubting—in fact any form of 
consciousness, including sensing.  Descartes thus acknowledged that the body and mind functioned as a unit, 
in contrast to poststructuralists who write as though the particular physical body for all intents and purposes 
is irrelevant to thinking/discourse.  The latter wrote about the body principally as a passive site of inscription.  
Hillcoat (1996, p. 100) commented, “the subjectivity of the body is defined entirely through the inscription 
of social and political discourses.  …  there is no role for the physical body in inscribing subjectivity …. we 
get no sense of the mind's location within an active human body”. 
This would still seem to me to imply a dualistic separation of the body and the mind, or perhaps, in Margaret 
Wertheim’s (1999) use of the term, a “monistic” position, since it focuses on one pole only of a binary 
contrast.  Referring to the modern Western scientific view Wertheim (1999) wrote, 
It is a complete misnomer to call the modern scientific world picture dualistic; it is monistic, admitting 
the reality only of physical phenomena.  Here, the Christian soul is not the basis for another level of 
reality, as the medievals believed, but a chimera of the imagination--Gilbert Ryle's `ghost in the 
machine.'  (p. 153)  
For many poststructuralists only discourse artefacts (including the inscribed body read as a text) are allowed 
reality, and any other reality is usually denied.  Dualism has not been resolved by accepting the mind and the 
body as two sides of the same coin, but by more or less ignoring the relevance of an active role for the 
individual body. 
Some cyberspace writers apparently view the material body as similarly separable from meaning making.  
Wertheim (1999), identifying the spirituality she found in cyber culture, saw it as a reaction against centuries 
of materialism, a reaction against rejection of the metaphysical by modern science.  “The Pearly Gates of 
Cyberspace” is an argument that Western human beings cannot accept that reality is limited to the purely 
physical and seek recognition for a supra-physical dimension of experience (cf. Heaven).  She was 
unimpressed with dismissals of human subjectivity, and although she was referring principally to the 
discourse of science, what she wrote could apply almost equally well to other discourses which refuse to 
acknowledge individual consciousness.   
No matter how often reductionists insist that we are nothing but atoms and genes, there is clearly more 
to us than this.  `I think; therefore I am,' Descartes declared; and whether we modify `think' to `feel,’ or 
suffer,' or `love,' what remains is the indissoluble `I,' and deal with it we must. … Sensing that 
something crucial has been occluded from the physicalist picture, they are looking elsewhere in the hope 
of locating this missing ingredient.  " (Wertheim, 1999, p. 40) 
Wertheim saw the omission of a satisfactory role for consciousness in scientific theory as “an important 
factor in the appeal of cyberspace, for it is this immaterial `I' that in some sense cyberspace caters to” 
(Wertheim, 1999, p. 40).  The Internet once again promises to make possible transcendence of the physical.  
Crediting William Gibson with the introduction of the term “cyberspace” into our language, she noted that, 
in his “prescient sci-fi novel”, Neuromancer, Gibson (1986, cited in Wertheim, 1999) hailed `the bodiless 
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exaltation of cyberspace.' Moreover, she went on to show that it was not only in fiction that this belief was 
growing and quoted numerous writers in the computing world.  For example, she cited the claim of “real-life 
virtual reality pioneer Jaron Lanier” that “this technology has the promise of transcending the body" (p. 26).  
Wertheim (1999) also gave examples of cases where some Internet users became so involved in their fantasy 
lives as MUDers1 that the experiences and relationships formed there became more real to them than—or at 
least as important as—their “real life” relationships and experiences.  Another feature of this cyber culture 
was that individuals could have multiple simultaneous identities in this world and moving between multiple 
open `Windows’ was cited as a good metaphor of how such lives were lived (Turkle, 1995, cited in 
Wertheim, 1999, p. 248), with “RL” (real life) being like just another Window (cf. Wertheim, p. 250).  
However Wertheim pointed to the differences between the quality of on-line and off-line lives and 
questioned the reality and independence of these identities.  For her, acting out different fantasy lives, while 
it might serve many useful purposes, was not the same thing as living in a body that experienced physical 
pain, the consequences of real-world relationships and real mortality.  And having a truly split personality 
(such as that suggested by the “MIT sociologist of cyberspace”, Sherry Turkle, 1995, cited in Wertheim, 
1999) would, in the end, be most likely to be dysfunctional and to reduce rather than expand one’s options.   
More significantly for the purposes of my argument, she also drew the reader’s attention to some of the 
futuristic writing involving computers, in which it was envisaged that human beings would eventually 
transcend the material world, achieving a complete separation of mind and body, and in the process, possible 
consciousness even after death of the body.  Describing the scenario proposed by a world-renowned robotics 
expert, Carnegie Mellon's Hans Moravec, of downloading the brain into a computer, Wertheim (1999) 
explained, “Gradually, as your brain is destroyed, your `real' self--that is, your mind--would be transformed 
into a digital construct" (p. 264).  Wertheim had previously written in Pythagoras’ Trousers (Wertheim, 
1997) about the inseparability of the development of western science and religion from earliest times, with 
the abstractions created by science and mathematics being seen as transcending mere physical existence and 
therefore as evidence of the mind of God.  In The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace, she interpreted what she was 
finding in cyber culture as evidence of a continued human longing for the transcendent, and a continuing 
belief in dualism, in the body and soul being separable. 
Once again, then, we see in the discourse about cyberspace a return to dualism, a return to a belief that 
man is a bipolar being consisting of a mortal material body and an immaterial `essence' that is 
potentially immortal.  This posited immortal self, this thing that can supposedly live on in the digital 
domain after our bodies die, this I dub the `cyber-soul'.  (p. 268) 
My PhD research 
In my PhD research, I demonstrated the significant part played in the construction of my knowledge by my 
body, claiming in fact that the workings of my “mind” were in fact the workings of my particular body, 
much of it outside my awareness.  In one sense, this was simply one “instance” (cf.  Barthes, 1977) of the 
surrounding culture, the coming together at one time and place of various cultural traditions.  However, 
consistent with my argument above, my particular learning was also the result of what I’m comfortable with 
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calling “the laws of nature”, evidence of how human body-minds work in general and how mine worked in 
particular.  
I was researching the kinds of change involved in learning, initially by focusing on “conceptual change” in 
science students, but later broadening the focus to explore teacher change, and finally including learning in 
my own context as a research student.  In the process, I came to the conclusion that in all but the most trivial 
cases, learning was a difficult process that involved changes in beliefs, relationships, and even personal 
identity, all of which would be resisted to some extent, and hence involved the body-mind in more than 
logical processing.  I also argued that it required conscious assent and effort as well as involving 
subconscious processes and the feelings which alerted us to them, in the ways described above. 
This arguing for personal agency for the particular body-mind turned out to be problematic in a postmodern 
discourse environment.  Even though two examiners recommended that the thesis be accepted without any 
changes, two readers with strong associations with poststructuralism, including the third examiner, expressed 
reservations which revolved around the notion of [author]ity in writing, one critic commenting that “there 
must be death of the Author”.  Considering action at the level of the individual was problematic in a context 
where there has been a rejection of the individual as a significant unit of agency in favour of culture as the 
active agent.  I would accept that we are socialised into particular practices including our language practice, 
which means holding particular beliefs and developing particular aspects of our identity.  However, I would 
not accept that individuals/authors function as passive and malleable objects, with consciousness, personal 
agency, and decision-making merely being part of the “inscribed” body’s resultant “performance”. 
Such a view seems to make little allowance for the struggle involved in the practice of a particular individual 
author.  Similarly, it overlooks the distinctiveness and creativity of authors who participate in the emergence 
of new meanings.  It also fails to serve as an adequate model for learning (including learning from research) 
since it explains little about the underlying tacit processes teachers or supervisors might need to know about 
to engage students in the “thinking” processes generally required of them.  These processes, as I have 
argued, require embodied mental activity involving emotions, feelings, intuitions, and associative thinking. 
Representing learning in a thesis 
This embodied view of knowledge, developed empirically during my PhD was the one I wished to represent 
in my thesis.  There were three main ways I wanted to present this view of knowledge. 
• Firstly I saw it as an outcome of my research (I found evidence of it both in my science education 
research and in my research on my own research process).  This could be presented using a 
straightforward analytic process typical of academic writing and hence would be endorsed by most 
academic readers.   
• Secondly, I saw it as part of my methodology.  Rather than pretending that I used systematic logical 
processes only, I saw all the embodied processes referred to above as contributing to my knowledge 
(practice) in significant ways and wanted to acknowledge this ecobiosocial2 system perspective.  
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Besides being a more accurate representation of the research process, not doing so would have 
undermined my research findings about the importance of the personal and particular in learning.  
Including this approach to knowledge in my methodology, however, was somewhat problematic, given 
the apparently unsystematic and personal nature of the journal writing that provided most of the 
evidence.  It included not only unstructured (or at last not formally structured) reflections, but also 
letters, poems, and innumerable unconnected memos, with the only apparent order being a chronological 
one.   
• Finally, given such a belief about knowledge, I wanted my thesis to demonstrate or represent the 
process satisfactorily.  This included firstly the way my knowledge developed differently in my 
different discourse communities contemporaneously, and hence the way knowledge could be 
discontinuous and at times, even incommensurable.  (I had included in one of my thesis chapters papers 
written for different discourse communities which I found could not then be rendered in some neutral or 
common discourse for the thesis.)  Secondly, it included the way knowledge could be represented as a 
dialogue between texts (different parts of the thesis) rather than as a progression of a single argument 
(though of course I do not wish to imply that knowledge is only a dialogue between texts).  It also 
included the way knowledge was produced by me with my particular history and body (with its 
particular memories, associations, relationships, physiology, biochemistry, affect, etc.) rather than from 
an abstract and disembodied authority.  In terms of negatives, this meant not presenting an unbroken 
linear argument within a single paradigm, not having a “final” conclusion, not trying to communicate 
meaning through argument alone, and finally definitely not allowing “death of the Author”. 
My research methodology therefore had to include such evidence and present it.  In fact, in contrast to 
concerns about Author-ity, I had done my best to undermine my authority in the text in several ways.  I had 
encouraged the reader to “choose [his or her] own adventure”, used a personal rather than an impersonal 
tone, pointed out how my perspective was ever changing rather than moving towards a definitive version, 
and, finally, declined to provide an authoritative conclusion.  I can only deduce that the use of the first 
person pronoun, “I”, particularly when it was used in a way that implied a particular person as author rather 
than collective wisdom, implied for some readers that I saw myself as the Author-ity.  Barthes (1977) had 
written that 
[W]riting is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin.  Writing is that neutral, composite, 
oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very 
identity of the body writing.  (p. 142) 
The main point Barthes (1977) seemed (to me) to be making in his book chapter entitled The Death of the 
Author was that critics were misguided in using the biography of the novelist to seek the meaning in a novel, 
and I would agree with this.  However, he also implied that texts were only “instances” of cultural meanings 
being quoted—“Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as I is never more than 
the instance saying I” (p. 145).  This can be read as implying that writing is a passive re-presentation of 
culture—with the author as a person not being relevant in this process.  By contrast, an ecological or 
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eco(bio)social system perspective (cf. Damasio, 1994; Hanrahan, 1999; Lemke, 1995; Maturana & Varela, 
1992) would imply that writing would be a dynamic interaction between a human being and culture, and as 
such would require a particular body to initiate and carry it through in a thought-ful way, particularly for a 
sustained argument such as a doctoral thesis.  Consequently, I would challenge the assumption that the use of 
the personal and particular “I” in the thesis was an improper move in the presentation of the knowledge 
resulting from my research.  I would also challenge the suggestion that it was a claim to anything more than 
a particular (well-informed but nevertheless personal) perspective. 
Conclusion 
I have been arguing that in Western culture there is a strong tradition of dualism, insisting on a clear 
separation of the body and mind, and that this way of thinking has persisted and is manifest in a university 
culture that believes itself to be post-materialist and post-humanist.  Even though explicit reference to 
religion, Heaven or spirits, is largely taboo in such a space, the idealist side of such dualism manifests itself 
in a desire to remove all evidence of influence of the physical body on products of the mind, so that 
transcendence can be achieved through the pure means of disembodied language.  I have argued that, given 
what has been presented in research and writing in neuroscience, cognitive science, psychopathology, as well 
as ecosystem analysis, it makes more sense to see the body and mind as a single inseparable unit, with 
neither existing except as part of the other.  To be consistent with such a view, I believe that research 
methodology should embrace rather than rule out the personal.  Seen in this light, the personal author is 
evidence of the contextualised nature of knowledge, a sign that research knowledge is human practice within 
a system that is both sociocultural and biophysical. 
My concern is that too great an emphasis on the cultural constructedness of meaning and performance may 
limit research and writing in education.  It may deny the possible significance of individual consciousness 
and activity that are the result of physical functioning, or the significance of interpersonal interactions that 
may operate outside awareness, outside language.  While such a poststructural or constructivist perspective 
may empower many by denying the “naturalness” of much of human behaviour and language, it may 
disempower others by refusing to recognise what may, in fact, be beyond cultural control, but could be 
changed by physical means.  It may discourage the implementation of theories of human learning and 
development that would enable teachers across the curriculum to create rich learning experiences for all their 
students in all areas of the curriculum.  In contrast to Knight (1995) who believed there was reason to fear 
the outcomes of “a new synthesis of biology, psychology, sociology”, I believe a more comprehensive 
recognition of what it means to be human would empower communities of learning in which the “new 
humanist critiques” can flourish.  Theory which includes neuroscience, ecology and sociology need not 
support a new posthuman, “totalizing framework”, as he fears (p. 33).  I am more optimistic than he appears 
to be about the possible answers to the question he poses: 
The question is, not whether schooling will change, but what forms that change will take, what ethical 
considerations underwrite it, what constructions of humanness are disabled and enabled, what values are 
affirmed or denied. (p. 32)  
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The “new and effective technology of behaviour, a posthuman constructing” (Knight, 1995, p. 33) he 
envisages would seem to me to be much more likely to result from the vestiges of dualist enlightenment 
beliefs—that disembodied intellects should rule human affairs—than from a system of beliefs that integrates 
body and soul, intuition and reason, arts and sciences, and which recognizes both human dignity and the 
importance of larger systems. 
This paper has been written from the point of view of a someone who inhabits a world somewhere between 
post-structuralism and neuroscience, between social constructivism and individual psychology, between 
sociological theory and the medical model, someone who finds herself unable to deny the advantages of 
either perspective in each of the pairs.  While I acknowledge our dependence on language and culture for 
higher order meaning-making, I want to claim that that such meaning-making is in turn dependent on the 
physiology and biochemistry of the human body which has, in its turn, developed in accordance with the 
parameters of its environment, both genotypically and phenotypically.  Some would see this perspective as 
having little validity in an academic context where using time-honoured scholarly genres skilfully is of 
paramount importance—regardless of the epistemological beliefs they imply.  However, I see new ways of 
acknowledging subjectivity in research and writing as having the potential to illustrate a non-dualistic 
approach to research and writing, an approach which refuses a clear separation between the personal and the 
social, between the body and the mind. 
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1 MUDs are role-playing Multiuser Domains, originally Multiuser Dungeons and Dragons. 
2 Lemke (1995) used the term ecosocial system to describe the system which contributes to the development of  a 
particular discourse; in my PhD, I described my methodology as ecobiosocial system analysis because I explicitly 
wanted to include the physical part of the ecosystem in my theory of learning in science classrooms and in research 
itself. 
